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ABSTRACT
In recent years, RTB(Real Time Bidding) becomes a popular
online advertisement trading method. During the auction, each
DSP(Demand Side Platform) is supposed to evaluate current op-
portunity and respond with an ad and corresponding bid price. It’s
essential for DSP to find an optimal ad selection and bid price deter-
mination strategy which maximizes revenue or performance under
budget and ROI(Return On Investment) constraints in P4P(Pay For
Performance) or P4U(Pay For Usage) mode. We solve this prob-
lem by 1) formalizing the DSP problem as a constrained optimiza-
tion problem, 2) proposing the augmented MMKP(Multi-choice
Multi-dimensional Knapsack Problem) with general solution, 3)
and demonstrating the DSP problem is a special case of the aug-
mented MMKP and deriving specialized strategy. Our strategy is
verified through simulation and outperforms state-of-the-art strate-
gies in real application. To the best of our knowledge, our solution
is the first dual based DSP bidding framework that is derived from
strict second price auction assumption and generally applicable to
the multiple ads scenario with various objectives and constraints.
KEYWORDS
Computational Advertising, Real Time Bidding, Demand Side
Platform, Bidding Strategy
ACM Reference format:
Huahui Liu, Mingrui Zhu, Xiaonan Meng, Yi Hu, and Hao Wang. 2017. Dual
Based DSP Bidding Strategy and its Application. In Proceedings of ACM
Conference, Washington, DC, USA, July 2017 (Conference’17), 10 pages.
https://doi.org/10.475/123_4
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, RTB(Real Time Bidding) becomes a popular
online advertisement trading method. There are three major roles
in the market, namely SSP(Supply Side Platform), DSP(Demand
Side Platform), and AdX(Ad Exchange). SSP controls huge amount
of websites and earns money by supplying impressions. DSP holds a
lot of advertisers and makes profit through fulfilling their demands.
AdX, an online advertisement exchange, docks SSPs and DSPs and
holds auctions.
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In a typical scenario, an audience visits one of the SSP’s web-
sites, then the AdX is informed and an auction is initiated. The
AdX broadcasts bid request to DSPs and waits for a short time(e.g.
100ms). Each DSP is supposed to evaluate current opportunity and
respond with an ad and corresponding bid price. The AdX gathers
bid responses arriving before deadline and determines the winner
and its bidding cost. Finally, the AdX notifies the SSP about the
auction result and the SSP serves the winner’s ad to the audience.
Figure 1: Real Time Bidding
There are two popular payment modes for advertisers
(1) P4P(Pay For Performance): the advertiser sets a CPP(Cost
Per Performance) and pays DSP the CPP times the units of
performance delivered by DSP(e.g. 1$/click*10clicks=10$).
(2) P4U(Pay For Usage): the advertiser sets a CR(Commission
Rate) and pays DSP the total bidding cost plus the fraction
of it as commission(e.g. (1+10%)*100$=110$).
DSP is interested in optimizing one of the following objectives
(1) Revenue: the total amount of money(e.g. 50$) earned from
advertisers through either paymentmodementioned above.
(2) Performance: the total units of performance(e.g. 20 clicks)
delivered to advertisers.
During the optimization, several constraints must be satisfied
(1) Budget Upper Bound: the maximum amount of money
the advertiser is willing to spend in DSP for a certain period
of time (e.g. 100$/day).
(2) ROI Lower Bound: the minimum value of ROI(Return
On Investment) which is defined as, for DSP, the revenue
earned from advertisers over the bidding cost payed to AdX
(e.g. DSP ROI is 1.1 when DSP earns 110$ and pays 100$)
and, for advertiser, the performance delivered by DSP over
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the money spent in DSP (e.g. advertiser ROI is 0.8 when
advertiser spends 100$ for 80 clicks).
It’s essential for DSP to find an optimal ad selection and bid price
determination strategy which maximizes revenue or performance
under budget and ROI constraints in P4P or P4U mode. We solve
this problem by
(1) formalizing the DSP problem as a constrained optimization
problem(Section 3),
(2) proposing the augmented MMKP(Multi-choice Multi-dim-
ensional Knapsack Problem) with general solution(Section
4),
(3) and demonstrating the DSP problem is a special case of the
augmentedMMKP and deriving specialized strategy(Section
5).
Our strategy is verified through simulation(Section 6) and out-
performs state-of-the-art strategies in real application(Section 7).
To the best of our knowledge, our solution is the first dual based
DSP bidding framework that is derived from strict second price
auction assumption and generally applicable to the multiple ads
scenario with various objectives and constraints. These are the
main contributions of this document.
Before further discussion, it’s worth to mention several points
about our problem configuration. First, PPI(Performance Per Im-
pression) is defined as the expected performance of one impression
with certain ad and its accurate prediction is of great importance
in performance estimation. However, PPI prediction is beyond the
scope of this document and we assume that the PPI is always explic-
itly provided in the rest of our discussion. Second, it is assumed that
all advertisers agree to the same payment mode and performance
metric and DSP prefers to optimize a pure objective rather than a
hybrid one. Third, the CPP in P4P mode or CR in P4U mode are
set on the ad level, i.e. the advertiser is able to set different CPP or
CR for his ads. And the constraints are set on ad group level, e.g.
the budget might be shared by ads of the same advertiser and DSP
might be interested in controlling its global ROI. At last, the ROI
lower bound for advertiser could also be interpreted as the CPP
upper bound which might be more familiar to some readers.
2 RELATEDWORKS
[14] suggests a linear bidding strategy which, given base price,
bids in proportion to the relative quality of impression. However,
their method is a heuristic one and lacks theoretical foundations.
Based on calculus of variations, [21] suggests a non-linear rela-
tionship between optimal bid price and KPIs. However, their strat-
egy is derived from first price auction assumption which doesn’t
hold in RTB. Besides, winning rate is explicitly modeled as a func-
tion of bid price in [21]. To find the analytical solution of the optimal
bid price, the winning rate function must be of specific forms, which
makes their method inflexible.
Both win rate and winning price are estimated in [11], and the
corresponding bidding strategy is provided. However, their strategy
doesn’t consider any constraints(i.e. budget) which are common in
real DSP applications.
While all above researches consider only one campaign, [20]
extends [21] and proposes bidding strategy for multiple campaigns.
However, [20] also shares the drawbacks of [21] as listed above.
[5] studies the joint optimization of multiple objectives with
priorities. [18] argues that the bid price should be decided based on
the performance lift rather than absolute performance value. Risk
management of RTB is discussed and risk-aware bidding strategy
is proposed in [19]. By modeling the state transition of auction
competition, the optimal bidding policy is derived in [1] based on
reinforcement learning theory.
The probability estimation of interested feedbacks plays a cen-
tral role in performance based advertising. CTR(Click Through
Rate) prediction is of great importance and extensively studied by
researchers. FTRL-Proximal, an online learning algorithm, is pro-
posed in [12] and sparse model is learned for CTR prediction. In
[6], a hybrid model which combines decision trees with logistic
regression outperforms either of these methods on their own. In [7],
field-aware factorization machines are used to predict CTR. Com-
pared with clicks, the conversions are even more rare and harder
to predict. To tackle the data sparseness, a hierarchical method is
proposed in [10] for CVR(Conversion Rate) prediction. Feedbacks
are usually delayed in practice and [2] tries to distinguish negative
training samples without feedbacks eventually from those with
delayed ones.
Bidding landscape is studied in [4] and log normal is used to
model the distribution of winning price. [16] predicts win price
with censored data, which utilizes both winning and losing samples
in the sealed auction. Traffic prediction for DSP is discussed in [8].
Budget pacing is achieved through throttling in [17] and bid price
adjustment in [9].
Our work is mainly inspired by [3] in which compact allocation
strategy, after modeling its problem as linear programming, is de-
rived from complementary slackness. Sealed second price auction is
studied in [15]. After all, DSP problem is a sort of online matching
problem and [13] is an informative survey of this area.
3 FORMALIZATION
3.1 Primal
The DSP problem could be formalized as follows. Once we bid
Impression withAd , it results in gainV and resource consumptions
W , both of which are functions of BidPrice . Our total gain should
be maximized under resource constraints B with x and BidPrice
as variables. In addition, each Impression should be distributed
to no more than one Ad . To conquer the computational hardness,
indicator variable x is relaxed from {0, 1} to [0, 1]. Although most
kinds of resources(e.g. budget) are sort of private and only accessible
to very limited number of Ads in practice, we assume, without loss
of generality, that all resources are public and shared by all Ads in
this formalization.
max
xi j ,bpi j
∑
i j
xi jVi j (bpi j ) (1)
s.t.
∑
i j
xi jW
(k)
i j (bpi j ) ≤ B(k) ∀k (2)∑
j
xi j ≤ 1 ∀i (3)
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j (4)
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i ∈ {1, 2, ...,N } is the index of Impression
j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} is the index of Ad
k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} is the index of Constraint
xi j is a relaxed variable, indicating whether Impressioni should
be given to Adj
bpi j , short for BidPricei j , is a variable
Vi j (bp) is the gain function of BidPrice with support [0,∞)
W
(k )
i j (bp) is the k-th resource consumption function of BidPrice
with support [0,∞)
B(k) is a resource limit constant
The above formalization might seem too abstract to capture the
details of those practical objectives and constraints discussed in
Section 1. To make things clearer, we
(1) derive the expected winning probability and bidding cost
under second price auction assumption(Section 3.2),
(2) define the utility function family F based on previous
derivation(Section 3.3),
(3) and show how to systematically encode those practical ob-
jectives and constraints into above formalization by setting
B and choosing V (bp) andW (bp) fromF (Section 3.4).
3.2 Second Price Auction
Most AdXes adopt sealed second price auction mechanism in
which the DSP with the highest bid price wins and pays the second
highest bid price. For example, three DSPs bid 2$, 1$, 3$ respectively,
so the third DSP wins and pays 2$. Furthermore, only the winner
has access to the second highest bid price while the others observe
nothing except the fact that they lose.
Due to the dynamic nature of auction, the outcome is random.
To model this uncertainty, pi (x) is defined as the distribution of the
highest bid price among all other DSPs’ bid prices for Impressioni
with support [0,∞). In another word, the most competitive DSP
will bid x for Impressioni with probability pi (x)dx .
To win Impressioni , our BidPrice must be higher than x , but we
will only pay x eventually. Then the expected winning probability
and bidding cost for our DSP could be defined as follows. As our
BidPrice goes infinite, we’ll win Impressioni with probability 1 and
our bidding cost must be the mean of pi (x).
Definition 3.1. Probi (BidPrice) =
∫ BidPr ice
0 pi (x)dx
Definition 3.2. Costi (BidPrice) =
∫ BidPr ice
0 xpi (x)dx
It is the non-negativity property of pi (x) and the integral forms
of Probi (BidPrice) and Costi (BidPrice) which play a central role
in our theory(Section 3.3). Except that, we make little, if any, as-
sumption about the distribution family of pi (x). In addition, in
some special cases, even explicit modeling of pi (x) is unnecessary
(Section 5.3 & 5.4), which simplifies the implementation of our
strategy.
Whenever it’s mandatory, pi (x) could be modeled with method
proposed by [16]. We could pick a distribution familyp(x ;θ )(e.g. log
normal) with parameter θ and learn a parameter predictor θˆ (i) from
historical bidding data which maximizes the following likelihood.∏
i ∈W in
pi (Costi ; θˆ (i))
∏
i ∈Lose
∫ ∞
BidPr icei
pi (x ; θˆ (i))dx (5)
The likelihood could be separated into two parts, i.e. one for
the impressions we won and the other for those we lost. For any
Impressioni that we won, the bid price of the most competitive DSP
must be equal to ourCosti , which suggests the first part. Otherwise,
the only thing for sure is that it must be higher than our BidPricei ,
which suggests the second part.
3.3 Utility Function Family
The practical V (bp) andW (bp) in DSP problem come from a
certain family which is defined here and whose properties are
shown without proof.
Definition 3.3. F is the function family that ∀f ∈ F is of
the form f (bp;ϕ,ψ ,p(x)) = ϕProb(bp) + ψCost(bp) =
∫ bp
0 (ϕ +
ψx)p(x)dx .
Theorem 3.4. Given ∀f ∈ F , we have f ′ = (ϕ +ψbp)p(bp).
Theorem 3.5. Given ∀f ∈ F , we have argmax
bp
f = −ϕ/ψ .
Theorem 3.6. Given ∀д,h ∈ F with shared p(x) andψ , we have
max
bp
д ≥ max
bp
f if and only if ϕд ≥ ϕf .
Theorem 3.7. Given ∀д,h ∈ F with shared p(x), we have d2hdд2 =
ϕдψh−ψдϕh
(ϕд+ψдbp)3p(bp) .
All above theorems are listed here for summarization purpose
and will be referenced when actually used. It’s safe to skip them
for now and come back later.
3.4 Objectives and Constraints
There are 4 practical objectives as listed in Table 1, i.e. revenue
and performance objectives in P4P and P4U modes. It’s straightfor-
ward to encode those objectives into standard form by definition.
There are 6 practical constraints as listed in Table 4, i.e. budget,
DSP ROI and advertiser ROI constraints in P4P and P4U modes.
Constraints like budget could be expressed in standard form nat-
urally. Others, though not so obvious at the first glance, could be
rewritten into standard form as well.
Take DSP ROI constraint in P4P mode for example. By definition,
we have ∑
i j
xi jCPPjPPIi jProbi (bpi j )∑
i j
xi jCosti (bpi j ) ≥ ROI
(k ) (6)
After multiplying both sides with the denominator, subtracting
both sides with the nominator, and combining items by xi j , we
have∑
i j
xi j {ROI (k )Costi (bpi j ) −CPPjPPIi jProbi (bpi j )} ≤ 0 (7)
It’s easy to encode this constraint into standard form with ϕ =
−CPPjPPIi j ,ψ = ROI (k ) and B(k ) = 0.
4 AUGMENTED MMKP
4.1 Primal
Now we propose the augmented MMKP which could be formal-
ized as follows and seen as an extension of MMKP with infinitely
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Table 1: Practical Objectives
Mode Type Definition Vi j (bp)
ϕ ψ
P4P Revenue
∑
i j
xi jCPPjPPIi jProbi (bpi j ) CPPjPPIi j 0
Performance
∑
i j
xi jPPIi jProbi (bpi j ) PPIi j 0
P4U Revenue
∑
i j
xi j (1 +CRj )Costi (bpi j ) 0 1 +CRj
Performance
∑
i j
xi jPPIi jProbi (bpi j ) PPIi j 0
Table 2: Practical Constraints
Mode Type Definition W
(k )
i j (bp) B(k )
ϕ ψ
P4P
Budget
∑
i j
xi jCPPjPPIi jProbi (bpi j ) ≤ Budдet (k ) CPPjPPIi j 0 Budдet (k )
DSP ROI
∑
i j
xi jCPPjPP Ii jProbi (bpi j )∑
i j
xi jCosti (bpi j ) ≥ ROI
(k ) −CPPjPPIi j ROI (k ) 0
Advertiser ROI
∑
i j
xi jPP Ii jProbi (bpi j )∑
i j
xi jCPPjPP Ii jProbi (bpi j ) ≥ ROI
(k ) CPPjPPIi jROI (k ) − PPIi j 0 0
P4U
Budget
∑
i j
xi j (1 +CRj )Costi (bpi j ) ≤ Budдet (k ) 0 (1 +CRj ) Budдet (k )
DSP ROI
∑
i j
xi j (1+CRj )Costi (bpi j )∑
i j
xi jCosti (bpi j ) ≥ ROI
(k ) 0 ROI (k ) − (1 +CRj ) 0
Advertiser ROI
∑
i j
xi jPP Ii jProbi (bpi j )∑
i j
xi j (1+CRj )Costi (bpi j ) ≥ ROI
(k ) −PPIi j ROI (k )(1 +CRj ) 0
many sub-choices. In the original MMKP, both V andW are con-
stants, while, in the augmentedMMKP,V is variable andW becomes
function of V . Our main-choice and sub-choice are indicated by x
and corresponding V respectively.
max
xi j ,Vi j
∑
i j
xi jVi j (8)
s.t.
∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j ) ≤ B(k ) ∀k (9)∑
j
xi j ≤ 1 ∀i (10)
xi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j (11)
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,N } is the index of Item
j ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} is the index ofUser
k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} is the index of Constraint
xi j is a relaxed variable, indicating whether Itemi should be
given toUser j
Vi j is a gain variable
W
(k )
i j (V ) is the k-th resource consumption function of V with
support [0,∞)
B(k) is a resource limit constant
4.2 Dual
We define several basic functions and show the dual of aug-
mented MMKP based on them.
Definition 4.1. Fi j (V ; ®α) = V −∑
k
α (k )W (k)i j (V )
Definition 4.2. Vi j ( ®α) = argmax
V
Fi j (V ; ®α)
Definition 4.3. Si j ( ®α) = max
V
Fi j (V ; ®α)
min
α (k ),βi
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) +
∑
i
βi (12)
s.t. βi ≥ Si j ( ®α) ∀i, j (13)
α (k ) ≥ 0 ∀k (14)
βi ≥ 0 ∀i (15)
Fi j (V ; ®α) serves as sort of score functionwhich is used to estimate
the utility of distributing Itemi toUser j with sub-choiceV . It could
be interpreted as the compromised gain function in which our
original gain V is degenerated by resource consumptionW with
opportunity price α .
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Table 3: Auxiliary Problems
Name Description
P outer[inner]
D dualize(P)
DD dualize(dualize(P))
d outer[dualize(inner)]
dd outer[dualize(dualize(inner))]
4.3 Strong Duality
The strong duality of augmented MMKP is provable under mild
assumption. A brief proof is provided here and more details are
revealed in the appendix.
Theorem 4.4. IfW (V ) is convex function of V , strong duality of
augmented MMKP holds.
Proof. Several auxiliary problems are defined in Table 3. P is
the primal and could be separated into 2 nested steps. The inner
step, given xi j , maximizes objective withVi j as variables. The outer
step, maximizes objective with xi j as variables.
SinceW (V ) is convex function of V , inner is a strong duality
problem, inner = dualize(inner), P = d. Since dualize(inner) is a
strong duality problem, dualize(inner) = dualize(dualize(inner)), d =
dd. Since D is a strong duality problem, D = DD. dd and DD happen
to have the same form, dd = DD. As a result, P = D, strong duality
of augmented MMKP holds. □
4.4 Dual Based Strategy
With strong duality satisfied, several important properties are
claimed about the optimal solution of both primal and dual prob-
lems(i.e. x∗i j , V
∗
i j , ®α∗ and β∗i ), based on which we propose the dual
based strategy.
Theorem 4.5. V ∗i j = Vi j ( ®α∗).
Theorem 4.6. x∗i j (β∗i − Si j ( ®α∗)) = 0.
Corollary 4.7. If Si j ( ®α∗) < 0, we have x∗i j = 0.
Proof. Since Si j ( ®α∗) < 0 and β∗i ≥ 0, we have β∗i > Si j ( ®α∗).
Now that β∗i − Si j ( ®α∗) > 0 and x∗i j ≥ 0, taking above theorem into
consideration, x∗i j must be 0, that is Itemi should not be distributed
toUser j . □
Corollary 4.8. If Si j1 ( ®α∗) < Si j2 ( ®α∗), we have x∗i j1 = 0.
Proof. Similarly, since Si j1 ( ®α∗) < Si j2 ( ®α∗) and β∗i ≥ Si j2 ( ®α∗),
we have β∗i > Si j1 ( ®α∗). Now that β∗i − Si j1 ( ®α∗) > 0 and x∗i j1 ≥ 0,
taking above theorem into consideration, x∗i j1 must be 0, that is
Itemi should not be distributed to dominatedUser j1 . □
Theorem 4.9. β∗i (
∑
j
x∗i j − 1) = 0.
Corollary 4.10. If ∃j that Si j ( ®α∗) > 0, we have ∑
j
x∗i j = 1.
Proof. Since Si j ( ®α∗) > 0 and β∗i ≥ Si j ( ®α∗), we have β∗i > 0.
Now that β∗i > 0 and
∑
j
x∗i j − 1 ≤ 0, taking above theorem into
consideration,
∑
j
x∗i j must be 1, which means Itemi should not be
discarded. □
In summary, for each Itemi , everyUser j should propose its own
best score S∗i j achieved by V
∗
i j . Itemi should be awarded to the
dominating User j∗ if its best score S∗i j∗ is positive and discarded if
that is negative. Theoretically speaking, while most of which are
determined by above corollaries, behaviors remain undefined in
two special cases. First, there might be multiple dominating users
with the same best score. Second, the best score of dominating user
might be exactly zero. In practice, however, both cases are probably
rare due to the high resolution of items and users, and prone to
cause relatively limited damage. Ties could be broken by random
or heuristics.
Algorithm 1: Dual Based Strategy for Augmented MMKP
1 for Itemi ∈ I do
2 forUser j ∈ U do
3 Fi j (V ; ®α∗) = V −∑
k
α (k )W (k )i j (V )
4 V ∗i j = Vi j ( ®α∗) = argmax
V
Fi j (V ; ®α∗)
5 S∗i j = Si j ( ®α∗) = maxV Fi j (V ; ®α
∗)
6 end
7 j∗ = argmax
j
S∗i j
8 if S∗i j∗ ≥ 0 then
9 bid with (User j∗ , V ∗i j∗ )
10 end
11 end
4.5 Numeric Optimization
Note that, during the execution of the dual base strategy, only
the ®α∗ is mandatory while the others(i.e. x∗i j , V ∗i j and β∗i ) could be
recovered with ®α∗, which makes our strategy storage efficient. Next,
we propose the numeric method to solve ®α∗.
Definition 4.11. βi ( ®α) = max{0, Si j ( ®α)∀j}
Definition 4.12. Gi ( ®α) = ∑
k
α (k )B(k )
N + βi ( ®α)
By fixing ®α in the dual problem, β∗i could be calculated as β∗i =
βi ( ®α). Then the dual problem could be rewritten as
min
®α ≥0
∑
i
Gi ( ®α) (16)
and solved by SGD(Stochastic Gradient Descent). Due to the con-
vexity of dual problem, it must converge to the global optimal ®α∗.
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5 SOLUTION
5.1 Dual
We define corresponding basic functions and show the dual of
DSP problem based on them.
Definition 5.1. Fi j (bp; ®α) = Vi j (bp) −∑
k
α (k )W (k )i j (bp)
Definition 5.2. bpi j ( ®α) = argmax
bp
Fi j (bp; ®α)
Definition 5.3. Si j ( ®α) = max
bp
Fi j (bp; ®α)
min
α (k ),βi
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) +
∑
i
βi (17)
s.t. βi ≥ Si j ( ®α) ∀i, j (18)
α (k ) ≥ 0 ∀k (19)
βi ≥ 0 ∀i (20)
Note that, in DSP problem, our sub-choice is indicated by bp
rather than V . Since Fi j is the linear combination of Vi j (bp) and
W
(k )
i j (bp) fromF with shared pi (x), it must belong toF too with
its ϕFi j andψFi j as follows.
ϕFi j =ϕVi j −
∑
k
α (k )ϕ
W (k )i j
(21)
ψFi j =ψVi j −
∑
k
α (k )ψ
W (k )i j
(22)
In practice, each ad is usually subjected to very limited number
of constraints, which makes the calculation of ϕFi j andψFi j light-
weighted.
5.2 Strong Duality
Due to the nice property of F , it’s easy to check that, as to
practical objectives and constraints(Section 3.4),W (bp) is indeed
convex function of V (bp), which immediately justifies the strong
duality of DSP problem.
Theorem 5.4. Strong duality of DSP problem holds.
Proof. According to Theorem 3.4, V ′(bp) > 0 andW (bp) must
be function of V (bp). According to Theorem 3.7, d2WdV 2 ≥ 0 and
W (bp) must be convex function of V (bp). As a result, according to
Theorem 4.4, strong duality of DSP problem holds. □
5.3 Dual Based Strategy
With strong duality satisfied, the dual based strategy developed
for augmented MMKP is also applicable to DSP problem. Generally
speaking, bp∗i j could be determined without pi (x) according to
Theorem 3.5. In certain applications, ψFi j is the same for given i
and all j, then j∗ could also be determined independent of pi (x)
according to Theorem 3.6. By disposing of pi (x) completely from
deciding process, it not only simplifies the computation, but also
encourages pi (x) free training process.
Algorithm 2: Dual Based Strategy for DSP Problem
1 for Impressioni ∈ I do
2 for Adj ∈ A do
3 ϕFi j = ϕVi j −
∑
k
α (k )ϕ
W (k )i j
4 ψFi j = ψVi j −
∑
k
α (k )ψ
W (k )i j
5 Fi j (bp; ®α∗) =
∫ bp
0 (ϕFi j +ψFi jx)pi (x)dx
6 bp∗i j = bpi j ( ®α∗) = argmax
bp
Fi j (bp; ®α∗) = −ϕFi j /ψFi j
7 S∗i j = Si j ( ®α∗) = maxbp Fi j (bp; ®α
∗)
8 end
9 j∗ = argmax
j
S∗i j
10 if S∗i j∗ ≥ 0 then
11 bid with (Adj∗ , bp∗i j∗ )
12 end
13 end
5.4 Numeric Optimization
The numeric method developed for augmented MMKP is also
applicable to DSP problem. It’s easy to prove that dβi ( ®α )
dα (k ) must
be either −W (k )i j (bpi j ( ®α)) if the best score of the dominating Adj is
positive or 0 otherwise. This optimizationmethod, though generally
applicable, requires explicit modeling of pi (x).
Through executing our strategy in production environment, the
randomized version ofW (k )i j (bpi j ( ®α)) is revealed and the gradients
could be approximated with these feedbacks. This optimization
method is pi (x) free and much easier to implement.
6 SIMULATION
6.1 Methodology
To eliminate the uncertainty, our strategy is verified in P4P and
P4U modes through simulation. Due to the limited space, we focus
on the P4P mode in the rest of Section 6.
There are two simulation cases, i.e. one for revenuemaximization
and the other for performance maximization. Two mocked ads Ad1
and Ad2 are created with CPP1 = 1 and CPP2 = 2. Four mocked
constraints are listed in Table 4. Budget of Ad1 and Ad2 are 20 and
10 respectively. The global DSP ROI lower bound is 2, while the
global advertiser ROI lower bound is 0.5. As suggested by [4], p(x)
is assumed to be log normal distribution p(x ; µ,σ ) with mean µ and
standard deviation σ as parameters. To mock the impressions, 200
tuples <µi , σi , PPIi1, PPIi2> are drawn randomly.
Once the configurations are ready, ®α∗ are solved by SGD(Section
5.4). After that, the dual based strategy is applied on the same cases
and the consequent statistics are collected.
6.2 Results and Analysis
The statistics and ®α∗ are listed in Table 5. In both cases, all
resources have non-negative surplus and no constraint is violated.
In addition, the gap between primal and dual objective values is
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Table 4: Mocked Constraints
k Type Parameter Scope
1 Budget Budдet (k ) = 20 {Ad1}
2 Budget Budдet (k ) = 10 {Ad2}
3 DSP ROI ROI (k ) = 2 {Ad1,Ad2}
4 Advertiser ROI ROI (k ) = 0.5 {Ad1,Ad2}
negligible(Theorem 5.4). As mentioned earlier, the α∗ serves as so
called opportunity price of the resource. Intuitively speaking, waste
of resource with positive surplus shouldn’t lead to any opportunity
cost. As a result, the corresponding α∗ tends to be 0.
7 APPLICATION
7.1 Scenario
Wealso deploy our strategy in theDSP platform of Alibaba. In our
application, advertisers set budgets and pay for clicks, while DSP is
willing to maximize revenue under daily global DSP ROI constraint.
There are so many ads in our inventory that it’s impossible to go
through each ad before auction deadline. Although these budgets
are quite large totally, they are relatively small on average.
With well calibrated CPP and PPI predictors, the problem could
be transformed equivalently into one in P4P mode. And to meet
the latency requirement, the whole deciding process is decomposed
into two stages with so called logical ad.
Logical ad should be seen as proxy of physical ads and binded
with specific ad retrieval algorithm. In the first stage, DSP is sup-
posed to make decisions among just a few logical ads and respond
in time. In the second stage, once the chosen logical ad wins the
auction, physical ad is lazily retrieved with corresponding algo-
rithm.
Figure 2: Real Time Bidding with Logical Ad
Our logical ads are actually based on 4 heterogeneous ad retrieval
algorithms whose details are beyond the scope of this document.
These algorithms are sorted by their historical performance in de-
scending orders and 4 logical ads are constructed correspondingly.
In summary, our problem could be approximately modeled as,
given 4 logical ads with literally unlimited budget, maximizing
revenue under daily global DSP ROI constraint in P4P mode. Since
there is only one resource constraint, superscript k is omitted and
ROI is short for global DSP ROI in the rest of Section 7.
According to our theory, we have ϕFi j = (1 + α)CPPjPPIi j and
ψFi j = −αROI . SinceψFi j is always −αROI , no pi (x) is required in
deciding process as discussed in Section 5.3. To take full advantage
of that, we adopt a simplified version of the pi (x) free optimization
method suggested in Section 5.4, i.e. α ′ = ROIActualROI (α )α .
7.2 Experiment Groups
We compare our strategy with a variation of linear bidding strat-
egy. In [14], it’s suggested that bpi j =
ActualCTRi j
CTR Bid with Bid
set by operation team. However, unlike ActualCTRi j which is in-
dependent of bpi j , ActualROIi j indeed varies with it. As a result,
we iteratively update bpi j with bp
′
i j =
ActualROIi (bpi j )
ROI Bid .
We also apply optimal RTB theory to our application for compar-
ison. According to [21], we model the win probability asw(bp; c) =
bp
c+bp and bid with bpi j =
√
cCPPjPP Ii j
ROI (1 + 1λ ) + c2 − c , in which
c is fitted with method proposed by [16] and λ is iteratively tuned
with λ′ = ROIActualROI (λ)λ.
Four experiment groups are shown in Table 6. The first three
groups are designed to compare different strategies with single
logical ad, while the last group is used to test our strategy with
multiple logical ads.
To eliminate potential bias, the experiment lasts for a whole
ordinary week. Bidding opportunities are distributed to each group
randomly with equal probability. For fairness, the same CPP and
PPI predictors are shared by all groups. The lower bound of daily
ROI is set to 3.5.
Strategy parameters(i.e. bpi j , λ and α ) are randomly initialized
and periodically adjusted with actual ROI since last update. The pe-
riod is set to 24 hours for the LIN group due to the data sparseness
and 10 minutes as to the others for robustness and faster conver-
gence. Note that the more frequent update introduces inexplicitly a
10 minutes ROI constraint which is stricter than the daily one and
might degenerate the theoretical optimal.
7.3 Results and Analysis
For each group, the daily statistics of four metrics are plotted in
Figure 3, namely revenue, actual ROI, number of winning impres-
sions and revenue per winning impression.
The LIN , though with theoretical optimal intact, tends to earn
less revenue than the others in practice. In addition, it usually vio-
lates the daily ROI constraint seriously, so it’s an inferior strategy.
Compared with the DBs who claims a linear relationship be-
tween bid price and expected revenue, theORTB, derived from first
price auction assumption, suggests a non-linear one. It is biased
towards the impressions with low expected revenue and against
those with high expected revenue, which leads to more impressions
and lower averaged quality. While the daily ROI constraint is satis-
fied by both strategies, the DBs earns more revenue than theORTB.
As a result, the DBs is superior theoretically and practically.
TheDBm , as an ensemble of four ad retrieval algorithms, achieves
the most revenue without violation of the daily ROI constraint and
becomes the best strategy.
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Table 5: Statistics and α∗
Case Description Primal Dual Resource α∗
k Limit Consumption Surplus
Case1
Revenue
Maximization 2.164 2.164
1 20.000 0.865 19.135 0.000
2 10.000 1.299 8.701 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.749
4 0.000 -0.433 0.433 0.000
Case2
Performance
Maximization 1.590 1.590
1 20.000 1.100 18.900 0.000
2 10.000 0.979 9.021 0.000
3 0.000 2.747 -2.747 3.654
4 0.000 -0.550 0.550 0.000
Table 6: Experiment Groups
Group Inventory Strategy bpi j Iteration Period
LIN {LoдicalAd1} Linear bpi j bp′i j =
ActualROIi (bpi j )
ROI Bid 24 hours
ORTB {LoдicalAd1} Optimal RTB
√
cCPPjPP Ii j
ROI (1 + 1λ ) + c2 − c λ
′
= ROIActualROI (λ)λ
10 minutesDBs {LoдicalAd1} Dual Based CPPjPP Ii jROI (1 + 1α ) α
′
= ROIActualROI (α )αDBm {LoдicalAdj |j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}}
Figure 3: Experiment Results
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORKS
In this document, we propose a dual based DSP bidding strategy
derived from second price auction assumption according to convex
optimization theory. Our strategy is verified through simulation
and outperforms state-of-the-art strategies in real application. It’s
a theoretically solid and practically effective strategy with simple
implementation and various applications.
Three problems remain unsolved and deserve further study. First,
is there a better way to solve ®α∗ of large scale in dynamic environ-
ment? On the one hand, in a typical DSP, there will be millions
of constraints shared by similar number of ads. Each of the con-
straints deserves a α , which makes the vector ®α very large. On
the other hand, billions of impressions are broadcast by AdX ev-
ery day and bid by hundreds of DSPs simultaneously. The bidding
strategies are interactively adjusted by DSPs and the inventories
are frequently updated by advertisers, which makes the bidding
landscape unstable. Both properties make the ®α∗ hard to solve.
Second, how to construct and index logical ads automatically in
massive ads applications, balancing latency and performance? It’s
obvious that both deciding and training processes share the same ad
evaluation and maximum determination style, which makes their
computational complexities linearly related with the number of
candidate logical ads. At one extreme, each ad is represented by
exactly one logical ad, and the consequent latency is unacceptable.
At the other extreme, all ads are represented by the only logical ad,
while the performance might be seriously degenerated. A proper
compromise combined with efficient indexing tricks will accelerate
both processes by orders of magnitude.
Third, how to optimally break ties when they are common and
critical? Take an imaginary scenario for example. DSP is willing to
maximize its revenue in P4P mode. There are two identical ads with
the same CPP and PPI, but they are targeted to overlapped sets of
impressions and subjected to different budget constraints. In this
circumstance, resolution of impressions and ads is extremely low
and ties are very prevalent. To tackle the tie breaking problem, we
might try randomized soft-max instead of hard-max during ad selec-
tion. However, the theoretical soundness and practical effectiveness
of this tie breaking strategy are to be verified.
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A STRONG DUALITY PROOF
Here we give the detailed proof of the strong duality. We first
prove that P ≤ D by dualizing P.
P = − min
xi j ,Vi j∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j )≤B(k )∑
j
xi j ≤1
xi j ≥0
{−
∑
i j
xi jVi j }
= − min
xi j ,Vi j
{ max
α (k ),βi ,γi j ≥0
{−
∑
i j
xi jVi j
+
∑
k
α (k )[
∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j ) − B(k )]
+
∑
i
βi (
∑
j
xi j − 1) +
∑
i j
γi j (−xi j )}}
= − min
xi j ,Vi j
{ max
α (k ),βi ,γi j ≥0
{−
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) −
∑
i
βi
+
∑
i j
xi j [−Vi j +
∑
k
α (k )W (k )i j (Vi j ) + βi − γi j ]}}
≤ − max
α (k ),βi ,γi j ≥0
{ min
xi j ,Vi j
{−
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) −
∑
i
βi
+
∑
i j
xi j [−Vi j +
∑
k
α (k )W (k )i j (Vi j ) + βi − γi j ]}}
= − max
α (k ),βi ≥0
βi ≥Si j ( ®α )
{−
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) −
∑
i
βi }
= min
α (k ),βi ≥0
βi ≥Si j ( ®α )
{
∑
k
α (k)B(k ) +
∑
i
βi }
=D
Next, we prove that D = DD by dualizing DD.
D = min
α (k ),βi
{ max
xi j ,ζ (k ),ηi ≥0
{
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) +
∑
i
βi
+
∑
i j
xi j [Si j ( ®α) − βi ]
+
∑
k
ζ (k )(−α (k )) +
∑
i
ηi (−βi )}}
= min
α (k ),βi
{ max
xi j ,ζ (k ),ηi ≥0
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k ) − ζ (k))
+
∑
i
βi (1 −
∑
j
xi j − ηi ) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
= max
xi j ,ζ (k ),ηi ≥0
{ min
α (k ),βi
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k ) − ζ (k))
+
∑
i
βi (1 −
∑
j
xi j − ηi ) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
= max
xi j ,ζ (k )≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{min
α (k )
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k ) − ζ (k)) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
=DD
After that, we prove that P = d by dualizing the inner step of P
with the outer step unchanged.
P = max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{ max
Vi j∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j )≤B(k )
{
∑
i j
xi jVi j }}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{− min
Vi j∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j )≤B(k )
{−
∑
i j
xi jVi j }}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{−min
Vi j
{ max
α (k )≥0
{−
∑
i j
xi jVi j
+
∑
k
α (k )[
∑
i j
xi jW
(k )
i j (Vi j ) − B(k )]}}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{−min
Vi j
{ max
α (k )≥0
{−
∑
k
α (k )B(k)
+
∑
i j
xi j [−Vi j +
∑
k
α (k)W (k )i j (Vi j )]}}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{− max
α (k )≥0
{min
Vi j
{−
∑
k
α (k )B(k)
+
∑
i j
xi j [−Vi j +
∑
k
α (k)W (k )i j (Vi j )]}}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{− max
α (k )≥0
{−
∑
k
α (k)B(k ) −
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{ min
α (k )≥0
{
∑
k
α (k)B(k ) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
=d
At last, we prove that d = dd by dualizing the inner step of d
with the outer step unchanged.
d = max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{min
α (k )
{ max
ζ (k )≥0
{
∑
k
α (k )B(k ) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)
+
∑
k
ζ (k)(−α (k ))}}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{min
α (k )
{ max
ζ (k )≥0
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k ) − ζ (k )) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}}
= max
xi j ≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{ max
ζ (k )≥0
{min
α (k )
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k ) − ζ (k )) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}}
= max
xi j ,ζ (k )≥0∑
j
xi j ≤1
{min
α (k )
{
∑
k
α (k )(B(k) − ζ (k )) +
∑
i j
xi jSi j ( ®α)}}
=dd
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It’s obvious that DD and dd are of the same form, so DD = dd.
As a result, we have P = D and strong duality holds.
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